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‘Anticolonial friendships’: How should anthropologists learn from Uyghurs in contemporary China?

When I was first starting to research Xinjiang as a graduate student in the late 2000s, I spent a few weeks with a Taiwanese-American anthropologist at Berkeley named Cindy Huang, who was just finishing her doctorate. Cindy, whose parents were born in eastern China’s Zhejiang Province and who still has family there, had lived in Xinjiang for over a year just before the mass violence of 2009.

In my conversations with her, and in her dissertation, she described the way Uyghur women welcomed her into their world as a friend and sister. After a year of building a relationship with her, her two closest Uyghur friends, Ayshe and Nurgul, cooked a special dinner for her. She wrote:

For more than a year, Ayshe has been searching for a suitable Uyghur name for me. She finally settles on Zuhre, explaining that it is a name with Arabic origins, meaning bright, beautiful star. She shaves down a chopstick, dips it in a jar of ink and writes my new name in elegant script. We feast on rice and stir-fried vegetables with mutton. We finish the meal by savoring juicy pomegranate seeds. Ayshe gives a short speech about how she hopes that I become a shining star in the future, leading others in times of darkness. Nurgul adds that I should become the guiding light for those who know nothing about Uyghurs. We laugh at the solemnity of the occasion, I more nervously than them. Though I doubt myself, I am touched that Ayshe’s faith extends to me. From that night onward, Ayshe and Nurgul call me Zuhre. Our improvised ceremony coincides with my transition from visitor to housemate. According to Uyghur custom, you are no longer a guest after three days have passed.

Though no one could forget that I was an outsider, Ayshe’s blessing was not for naught. I celebrated the small victories as much as the large. One afternoon early in my stay, I ate at a small restaurant near Urumqi’s Grand Bazaar. I was hungry and quickly slurped down a plateful of pumpkin and mutton dumplings. When I returned a few weeks later, I chatted with the wife of the owner and a few of the staff. As I finished my meal and tried to pay, no one would take my money. Finally, one of the waiters told me that it wasn’t generosity: on my previous visit, they had charged me double. Here, at least, I would no longer have to pay the foreigner tax.

Receiving Ayshe’s blessing, however, did not mean that I was exempt from her criticism. After a frustrating week of conjugating Uyghur verbs, I complained to her that my progress was slower than I had hoped. So many people had praised me the week before, Ayshe responded, perhaps I had attracted the evil eye. I understood that Ayshe was warning me against being prideful. There would be plenty of opportunities for friends to chide me for failing to understand or follow what they took to be common sense or moral and spiritual truths. Even as I blushed and at times resisted, I took their prodding and censure as a good sign: not only was I someone other than a guest, I was also a person worth cultivating.

Cindy, like me, was deeply influenced by a feminist, anticolonial anthropology. Scholars like Trinh Minh-Ha and Saba Mahmood, who taught at Berkeley, showed her — and, through their writing, me — the value of “speaking nearby” the people whose voices we were attempting to amplify as anticolonial anthropologists. This meant that as scholars (though Trinh was also speaking to journalists and filmmakers), we should draw on intimate observations and relationships as we strive to understand and represent worlds that are not our own. But we should always be clear that though we draw close to others, there are aspects of who they are that we can never fully know. For example, when we analyzed and explained how stereotypes about Muslims caricatured their lives, we were not trying to speak for them, but rather we were thinking in dialogue with them, accountable to them as partners in creating knowledge about their lives.

At the University of Washington, I met another Chinese American anthropologist and gender studies scholar, Sasha Su-Ling Welland, who became my primary mentor. Drawing on the writing of another feminist anthropologist, Lila Abu-Lughod, Sasha taught me about writing anthropology in a way that explicitly attempts not to “dominate” the communities we engage with, but rather to reverse the colonial gaze by uplifting voices, knowledge, and practices of the people we meet.

It was this training that has pushed me to foreground my position as a white male settler from North America. It is also why I try to be as clear as possible with my interview subjects and in my analysis of my ethnography that what I do in my writing cannot and should not be read as an attempt to “save” the colonized from their suffering; instead, as I note in the end of the introduction to Terror Capitalism, I am trying to uplift unheard voices so that readers can sit with them — and I hope really hear and recognize their human experiences. I argue that ethnographers should refuse to be enticed by white, liberal framings of universal values that can be projected onto the colonized in order to “save them” and make them conform to white liberal values.

Anthropology cannot “save” the people anthropologists care about. When anthropologists do speak, it should be alongside the voices of the disenfranchised, speaking as listeners and translators. The inability of ethnography in itself to offer more than palliative protection for the colonized is a difficult truth, but it is one that I have been forced to sit with. The rage I feel about the ongoing loss of my friends fuels my work of translating and documenting state and corporate violence.

In a similar way, I do not want to claim some sort of presumed neutrality because I’m an outsider, as much as readers may project this onto me. This is why I say explicitly in the introduction to Terror Capitalism that I am making an argument for global decolonization. For me this means calling out global histories and circuits of power and uplifting the voices of the silenced beyond the nation-state form.

My goal is also not to make this a story about me. My training, which was shaped so directly by Chinese-American feminist scholars, has taught me that anticolonial work is about honoring colonized carriers of knowledge, not centering the self and the standpoint one grew up with, even as it means grappling with and using the histories and privileges one carries in their body. Committing to this kind of work as someone who has benefited from histories of colonization is something I refer to in my writing as “anticolonial friendship.” To me, it requires building relationships with the colonized that reshape the daily life of the colonizer and that over time strives to redistribute power. It means respecting different experiences of history, even as we strive to build solidarity across those differences. It means caring for others even when you cannot fully protect them.

But what does this mean in practice, and how does it relate to the chiding and prodding that Cindy Huang described as part of her relationship with Uyghur women? In chapter five of Terror Capitalism, I write about a Han settler artist who has taken on a kind of colonial-traitor position by dedicating much of his life to documenting the violence against his Uyghur neighbors. Because this Han photographer, who I refer to as Chen Ye, engaged the community so directly and over such a long duration, Uyghur migrants came to refer to him by a Uyghur name, Ali Aka — or older brother Ali. They began to think of him as one of their community.

Most Han people I met in Xinjiang simply assumed that, as an American, I must instinctively agree with them that Muslims were inherently “backward,” a problem that required military force, police, and education. As I wrote recently, many assumed that the Muslims that the United States military fought in Afghanistan and Iraq were more or less the same as their Muslims, the Uyghurs.

Chen Ye, however, was unusual in the way he was able to question his own Islamophobia. For instance, at one point he asked me, “What is wrong with Islam? Why does it make Uyghurs do what they do?” We had a long discussion unpacking why he thought these were the questions he should be asking. And whether or not a better question might be why do people use Islam in the way that they do? And how is that use of Islam related to the state violence they have experienced?

But as much as he was willing to question his assumptions, when I staged a private meeting with him and Ablikim, my cotranslator of the Uyghur novel The Backstreets, Chen Ye talked about all of the violence he had seen and how he came to see that Uyghurs were kind-hearted — “just like all lǎobǎixìng 老百姓.” In that moment, when Chen Ye referred to Uyghurs as being “just like all the ‘old hundred names,’” a cloud came over Ablikim’s face. To his thinking, laobaixing was a term that refers primarily to Han workers and farmers, was not equivalent at all to the position of Uyghurs. Laobaixing in Xinjiang are privileged settlers relative to Uyghurs. Later, Chen Ye also referred to Uyghur migrants as mángliú 盲流, a term that means “blind wanderer” and is used by many people in China to refer to Han migrants. Chen Ye, like many Han migrants to Ürümchi, referred to himself in this way. So when he also used this term to refer to Uyghur migrants, it appeared to Ablikim that he was flattening out Uyghur differences, ignoring the structural forces that had forced Uyghurs from their ancestral lands and into a Han majority city. He was again conflating the experience of poor Han migrants with the colonial dispossession of Uyghur migrants.

When we talked about the encounter over the course of the many weeks we spent sitting side by side translating The Backstreets, Ablikim said that it was the way Chen Ye conflated Uyghur experience with Han experience that made him feel that Chen Ye still did not fully recognize the difference between being a colonized native and being a poor Chinese person. This is why Ablikim held his hand up with a one-inch gap between his thumb and forefinger and said that Chen Ye was “this close” to understanding. The problem was not that Chen Ye was Han or a Chinese citizen, but that he hadn’t yet fully understood how Uyghurs view the world and experienced histories of racialized trauma. The difference between Chen Ye and Cindy was that he had not learned to speak Uyghur and fully think about what it means to inhabit social positions from within that knowledge system.

This is not to say that Ablikim saw Chen Ye as performing a colonial politics. Ablikim saw Chen Ye’s work of witnessing Uyghur struggles as anticolonial. And he regarded him as a friend. Chen Ye was an exceptional figure in the way he made sacrifices to learn from ethno-racial minorities. I saw him as an anticolonial friend too, to me and to my Uyghur friends. As I write in the introduction, “Friendships, both between Uyghur men and across ethnic barriers, held out a promise of a more expansive form of social reproduction in which the work of sharing grief and rage through acts of storytelling and active witnessing was valued as a practice in and of itself.”

Anticolonial friendships come in many forms. They can include Han settlers from Anhui like Chen Ye and white American settlers from Ohio like me. They are imperfect, but they center on an effort to amplify the voices of the colonized and a careful effort to speak alongside them toward human liberation. When Ablikim told me that he thought Chen Ye was misrecognizing the Uyghur position, he was telling me this with the understanding that I would convey this to Chen Ye the next time I saw him. The critique was coming from a place of care. Ablikim was involving me in a process of prodding Chen Ye to be better. He was trying to make Chen Ye a better anticolonial friend.

On a recent trip to Taiwan, where I talked about the Taiwanese edition of my book In the Camps, I was struck by the way that audience members and journalists asked about the way my whiteness and Americanness shaped the way I was welcomed into Uyghur communities in Xinjiang. It is undeniable that my position as a privileged outsider, a representative of what Jay Ke-Schutte terms the Angloscene, meant that people were interested in getting to know me. But this interest was often utilitarian — a way of practicing English or a source of information about getting an American visa — not one of immediate trust. In fact, dozens of times, Uyghurs assumed that I, like the vast majority of global North foreigners in Ürümchi at the time, was a Christian missionary — a misrecognition that resonates with the misrecognition Uyghurs had toward Chen Ye, when they thought he might be a Korean missionary. This position, the missionary, was one that Uyghurs like Ablikim did not identify as neutral or anticolonial. While less dangerous than agents of the Chinese state, they often saw Christian missionaries as extractive and, at times, offensive.

I, like Cindy Huang and Chen Ye, found that moving into deeper relationships with Uyghurs meant seeing them by more than simply their ethnicity or citizenship status. Trust could only be built through our shared experiences and examinations of our differences. They tested my solidarity with Palestinian struggles, of Kashmiri struggles, my knowledge and respect for Islamic traditions. Uyghurs were interested to hear about the way I had come to understand my position as a settler in relation to Indigenous peoples in the Americas, what I thought about police brutality and prison abolition. They liked that I saw value in their stories, their poetry, their music, their village traditions, and that I turned to them as carriers of knowledge, as my teachers.

They saw me as different from the Han anthropologists who had stolen their sacred songs or made exquisite documentary films but treated Uyghur collaborators only as assistants. They saw me this way not because I was a white American, but because I was learning their language and history, and because we were becoming friends who lent each other money and shared the same life events. When they saw me doing or saying something that was disrespectful or offensive, they told me. They saw me in much the same way that Cindy’s Uyghur friends saw her.

In 2017, a Han graduate student from Hangzhou named Feng Siyu began working with Uyghur anthropologist Rahile Dawut at Xinjiang University’s Folklore Research Center. As a native Chinese speaker, Feng’s Uyghur language training was a major asset in communicating Uyghur traditional knowledge to the Chinese public. Her Chinese-ness and her commitment to understanding Uyghur struggles was precisely why Uyghur scholars wanted to work with her. But in 2018 she was arrested, precisely because of this work. According to internal police documents obtained by The Intercept, they detected “foreign obscure software” on her OnePlus smartphone. Even though this software was part of the default software package of the phone and there was no evidence that Feng used what was likely VPN software, she was detained and, like Dawut, has been missing since.

Feng’s disappearance speaks to the threat and force of Chinese power over its own citizens, and the privileges that the imperial power of U.S. citizenship carries. I could do nearly the same work as Feng (though unlike her I no longer had formal affiliation with a Xinjiang-based institute); in fact, I was in Ürümchi in the same year of her arrest and was only subjected to harassment and brief detention. They let me go because of the protections I carried as a foreigner from a powerful country.

Chen Ye’s grassroots project and Feng’s more formal scholarship points to the possibilities (and state-imposed limits) of Chinese citizens doing ethical, anticolonial work in Xinjiang. And Feng and Chen Ye are not alone, over the past five years, dozens of Han citizens of China have shared information with me about what they have observed on the ground. They want the world to know that this is not the China they believe in, and they also recognize their relative privilege in being able to travel and share these stories.

Like all social sciences, and hard sciences, anthropology has a colonial history. It, like all sciences, has been dominated by white men. But it also offers a method for encountering and sitting with the world, and demanding something better. There is a whole generation of young members of the American Anthropological Association who voted to stand with Palestinians and Boycott, Divest and Sanction (BDS) all Israeli institutions. If the organization honours the wishes of its members, it will mean that all 10,000 members of the association will no longer be able, in good standing, to work with Israeli universities, companies, or government organizations. This BDS effort builds directly on similar efforts in the 2000s to divest from Apartheid South Africa. Many of the leaders of this effort in the American academy, particularly the feminist, anticolonial scholars Lisa Rofel and David Palumbo-Liu, who have directly influenced my book Terror Capitalism, have also been some of the most vocal public intellectuals in support of Uyghur rights.

There is much more that can and should be done to bring a decolonial ethos to the study of contemporary China, but I am deeply encouraged to see an emergent cohort of Chinese national anthropologists who have turned the focus of their life’s work toward supporting Muslims and other racialized minorities in China. Because this commitment comes at a cost to them and their relationships with their families who are still in China, the way they disclose this commitment must remain their prerogative. So I will name them only by their initials: M.Q., J.Q., and X.K. They are there, doing the work — translating, observing, going where us foreigners can no longer go — and I want them to know that I see them. And the Uyghur community sees them too.

This article first appeared in the China Project on June 21, 2023.

‘Nikah’: An astonishing portrait of Uyghur life on the edge of erasure

A still from “Nikah,” a fictional film by Mukaddas Mijit and Bastien Ehouzan, showing Dilber and Rena preparing for Rena’s wedding.

Mukaddas Mijit and Bastien Ehouzan’s Nikah is extraordinary. It is a quiet film, a portrait of a young Uyghur woman and her family living in a Uyghur world in the late 2010s. It is astonishing in its restraint, in the way it remains true to a ground-level view of what it looked and felt like to be on the verge of internment. Nikah is a portrait of the impossible becoming reality.

The story on the surface is a simple one. Two daughters in their twenties, Dilber and Rena, are caught between their own ambitions — careers, travel, love — and community pressures to follow gendered norms dictating what young women should do, whom they should get married to, and the life path of a wife and mother. After the younger sister, Rena, is married to a young man in the community, the pressure builds on the older sister, Dilber, to marry as well — or be lost to old age or, more ominously, as whispers imply, be married off to a Han man.

In 2017, the Chinese state criminalized much of what is portrayed in the film as signs of religious extremism. Drawing on one of the world’s broadest counterterrorism laws and a mandate from Xí Jìnpíng 习近平, police and civil servants began to use face-recognition video surveillance, informants, and torture to “round up those that needed to be rounded up.” Dilber and Rena — plus other characters portrayed in the film — are exactly whom that mandate was for. As viewers, we are placed on the precipice of the largest mass internment of a religious minority since World War II.

But it doesn’t feel that way until the film’s final sequence, when we witness the quiet shattering of the families we have met. This narrative technique, holding in reserve the immense tragedy that is about to emerge, is what makes this film so astonishing. It allows viewers to understand the stakes of that shattering, the absurdity of traditions misread and flattened by digitized anti-Muslim racism. And it also lets the viewer appreciate the extreme beauty of Uyghur communal life.

The director’s attention to form and gesture is what makes the quietness of the film come alive, as a document of not only tragedy unfolding, but also the ethos of Uyghur life: how people uphold the dignity of each other through mutual aid and respect; the way they sit, drink their tea, greet each other, move their bodies in relation to each other. All of it works as choreography of a Uyghur world that has been pared down to essential movements, words, and gestures.

The intimacy portrayed in the film is reminiscent of work by Central Asian and Iranian directors Saodat Ismailova and Mehdi Sahebi, and, in a different key, the Thai director Apichatpong Weerasethakul. All of these sources of inspiration for Mijit and Ehouzan utilize portraits of individuals to show how the intimacy of family and community relations sustain life even as they are constrained by larger social structures. This tension is at the heart of Nikah as well.

What makes this all the more stunning is that while Mijit — who took the lead role in writing and directing the film — is a professionally trained ethnomusicologist, dancer, and choreographer, the actors are non-professionals who are all making their cinematic debut. The fidelity they show to a life they knew before fleeing their homeland is what makes this film truly monumental.

As an ethnographer living in Ürümchi in 2015, I observed this life myself. On Saturdays, I joined groups of young men crowded into the gendered, age-appropriate section of weddings. They were dressed in their nicest shirts, and some even wore suits they had bought just for the occasion. The room often had a strong smell of sweaty feet in thin polyester socks. As we sat there, a molla, or religious leader, would address the young men.

For the next 20 to 30 minutes, the molla would talk about things such as the importance of being disciplined in seeking knowledge from a divine perspective. He might discuss how Islamic practices should help reveal truths about the world, dispelling ignorance and superstitions. He would likely emphasize that Islam, at its core, was about moral principles that should be applied within families and in marriages. To my mind, it was pretty standard messaging for Islamic weddings worldwide. There was no call to jihad or condemnation of the Chinese state.

After his speech, the molla conducted the marriage ceremony, or nikah, reciting a Quranic blessing in Arabic for the couple’s future life together. The recitation, which is what we hear in the film, resonated with Uyghur traditions across time. The young men around me would smile, knowing it was time for the marriage celebration to begin. A parade would wind across town, ending with food, music, and dancing.

A still from Nikah re-creating a Chinese surveillance video of the marriage procession following Dilber’s marriage.

In the film, we view these happy moments through the vantage point of face-recognition cameras. In the logic of the counterterrorism law, all of the hundreds of young men I attended weddings with in 2015, all of them, were extremists. All of the young men who had been there could be accused of receiving illegal religious teachings. Just being present in that room could label us as untrustworthy and requiring “reeducation.” The molla, a religious figure appointed by the government, could face a five-year prison sentence for that 20-minute speech and Quranic recitation.

No one gave it a second thought at the time. And in the film, we see the same unknowingness in the wedding’s guests. It seemed impossible that this could be criminal.

By the end of 2017, a few months after the period portrayed in the film, tens of thousands of Uyghurs and Kazakhs might have been detained for participating in such weddings. Researcher Peter Irwin’s data analysis showed that more than 1,000 imams and mollas have been detained. Internal police documents from Ürümchi that were obtained by The Intercept revealed even more religious figures being detained. Attending these gatherings, something often framed as “disrupting public order,” became a primary reason for detention among non-leaders.

A still from Nikah of an image of a buwi performing a ritual for Dilber before her marriage to a Uyghur man in France.

But the mass detentions did not stop there. According to a document published in 2017 by the Xinjiang Justice Ministry, it also targeted female community leaders, the buwi, who prepare the bodies of the dead for the afterlife, soothsayers that tell the future and offer protection from harm, healers that provide treatment for infertility and safety from the evil eye. This shamanic and Islamic figure plays an essential role in the care for the dead, the maintenance of sacred land, and the reproduction of Uyghur life. Their role, it appears, has now been largely eliminated as an active part of Uyghur life by the Chinese counterterrorism campaign. In the film, Mijit herself portrays a buwi, highlighting the stakes in the desecration of Uyghur knowledge-bearers.

The film shows that Uyghur life continues in the diaspora. But the everyday vitality of the Uyghur world, before the impossible became reality, may be forever lost. This is why the fidelity of the world that Mijit — whose grandparents are from Ghulja, where the film is set — and Ehouzan have re-created feels so shattering. They have shown us what was and could have been, and now is impossible.


Nikah is currently being shown in film festivals around the world. In Europe, it is available on demand through the major streaming platform Arte. A U.S.-based major film distributor is currently in talks with the film’s producers regarding further distribution in North America.

Now Is the Moment for Global Solidarity with China’s Ethnic Minorities

President Xi Jinping wants to be leader for life, but brave Chinese citizens continue to speak out against the increasingly authoritarian rule. We must stand with them.

DEENA GUZDER

October 6, 2022

President Xi Jinping is on the verge of securing an unprecedented third term as the leader of the world’s most populous country, the People’s Republic of China. On October 16th, the Communist Party congress will declare Jinping as China’s ruler for an additional five years. Such congresses typically bring in a new batch of rulers but Xi, who is also head of state and leader of the military, amended the party constitution in 2018 to remove all term limits on the presidency, effectively making him China’s self-appointed forever-leader.

Under Xi’s leadership of China since 2013, there have been a host of human rights violations that will only likely worsen in the next half decade unless confronted by human rights activists globally. Professor Darren Byler of Simon Fraser University said, “Over the course of his term in power, Xi Jinping has radically expanded the power of the state to prevent political, religious and ethnic minorities from demanding their constitutionally protected civil liberties. This means that labour rights organizing has been sharply curtailed, feminist leaders have been detained, and the practice of so-called ‘foreign’ religions such as Islam and Christianity have been tightly restricted. At the same time, ethno-nationalism shaped by the nationwide, obligatory study of ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ has risen to the fore.”

While the Chinese state tries to discredit any criticism of its human rights record, brave Chinese citizens continue to speak out against the increasingly authoritarian Chinese surveillance state at great risk to themselves.

Last month, the United Nations released a 45-page long-delayed report accusing China of serious human rights abuses against Uyghur Muslims and other minorities that may amount to crimes against humanity. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights said its investigation found credible evidence of torture; forced medical treatment; violations of reproductive rights; poor prison conditions; and individual incidents of sexual and gender-based violence against Uyghurs held in Chinese mass detention camps.

The U.N. released the report after months of unexplained delays and only moments before Michelle Bachelet ended her four-year term as U.N. human rights commissioner. Since then, Bachelet acknowledged she came under “tremendous pressure to publish or not publish” the report. A Chinese Foreign Ministry official condemned the U.N. report, writing in a statement, “It is completely a politicized document that disregards facts, and reveals explicitly the attempt of some Western countries and anti-China forces to use human rights as a political tool.”

While the Chinese state tries to discredit any criticism of its human rights record, brave Chinese citizens continue to speak out against the increasingly authoritarian Chinese surveillance state at great risk to themselves. Zhang, who only wants to be identified by her last name out of safety concerns, is a 25-year-old political asylum seeker from Xinjiang who now lives in New York City as an Au Pair. She is a mixture of Han and Uyghur ethnicities, but her national identity card states “Han,” the dominant group. Thus, she could have enjoyed all the privileges of majority rule but refused to be silent in the face of injustice when her Uyghur friend, Bahati Guli, inexplicably disappeared in October 2017. At the time, Zhang was studying in college in Guangdong. “I tried to contact my childhood friend many times on WeChat and call her but I got no response, so I was very worried.” When Zhang came back to her hometown for Chinese New Year in 2018, she tried again to find her childhood friend but to no avail. Zhang said, “After inquiring around, I found out that the whole family of Bahati Guli was taken away by the police. She was detained and her father and mother were also detained, but in different places. I know their family are honest and responsible people, I really don’t understand why their family was arrested by the police. I tried to visit her at the camp, but some plainclothes policemen were at the gate. They wouldn’t let me in at all, yelled at me and forced me away, and threatened me that if I came here again, I would be arrested and imprisoned for several years”.

Zhang was so disturbed by losing her friend she wrote about her on Chinese social media, Weibo, and was immediately blocked from the platform. Within two days, the Director of Academic Affairs at the university where Zhang was studying warned her not to stir up trouble or she could be expelled. Zhang agreed not to post on Weibo again until she finished her studies. Then, in 2020 COVID-19 broke out and cities across China went into strict lockdown. Zhang created a new Weibo account to criticize what she saw as her government’s oppressive response to the pandemic. On March 10th, 2021, Zhang posted an article titled “Today’s Xinjiang is China’s Tomorrow.”  The article talked about her experience growing up in Xinjiang under heavy surveillance and the arbitrary arrests of people like her childhood friend. The article was quickly blocked.  When speaking about it now, Zhang says she wrote the article out of concern that “the Xinjiang government collects personal identity and biometric information on the grounds of security, and there are checkpoints everywhere. The article also mentioned what happened to my friend Bahati Gull. I was hoping someone can provide more information about her, and at the same time call on the government not to arbitrarily arrest and detain people, whether they are Han Chinese or other minorities, and call for the establishment of a society ruled by law.”

Within an hour, Zhang’s Weibo account disappeared. That evening half a dozen police officers stormed her house. Zhang described what happened next:

One policeman pressed my head against the wall violently and forcefully, and handcuffed my hands behind my back. They ripped through my house without showing any documents.  My phone and computer were also confiscated. They asked me to point out where I put my ID card, and then took my ID card and verified my identity with me, took me into a police car, and sent me to Fuyong Police Station.  During this period, I tried to ask what happened, and the police yelled at me fiercely, telling me that I could only answer their questions, and can’t ask them any questions. After arriving at the Fuyong police station, they put me in the detention room by myself. I said, ‘Why are you imprisoning me?’ They ignored me and left. I stayed in the detention room for a long time, and I was frightened and scared. After a few hours, I was taken to an interrogation room by two policemen, who bound me in a specially designed interrogation chair. They asked me why I was writing this article on the Internet, and whether anyone behind it was directing me to write it in such a way as to endanger social stability. They also said that this is not the first time for me, the Internet is not a place outside the law, and any illegal comments made online will be known to the public security organs. I replied that what I wrote was factual, nothing false, and that I did not break the law. Maybe it was my toughness that angered them. A policeman walked up to me and slapped me vigorously several times, and I was slapped with a buzzing of ears and nosebleeds.  Another policeman started asking those questions repeatedly, and I kept my mouth shut. Seeing that I was still stubborn and uncooperative, they took me back to the detention room and threw me a pen and a piece of paper, yelled at me to write down the answers to the questions he had just asked me on paper, and to write down the confessions and repentances, and to promise not to do the same thing next time. He also said that when I wrote it, then he would let me go. Because they didn’t give me food, they didn’t let me sleep or go to the toilet, I was in a daze and didn’t know how long it took. I felt like I was about to collapse. I was crazy and wanted to hit the wall heavily. My body couldn’t support it anymore, so I wrote the so-called ‘Confession.’  When the police saw that I had finished writing, they gave me a cold box of lunch and a bottle of mineral water. They didn’t release me immediately, they also asked me to recite the confession I wrote and some laws and regulations. In this way, I was locked in the detention room for a period of time, during which time I could only get very little food. I only found out that I was locked up for 5 days after I was released. At the moment of release, I only had one strong thought, that is, to leave this country as soon as possible no matter what.

Zhang said she misses her friend and knows of so many others who have disappeared without reason. She added, “I was born and raised in Xinjiang, and I have lived in a place like a cage since I was a child: there are security checkpoints everywhere, and when I walk on the street, I will be stopped and questioned by the armed police or the police at any time. And they searched our bodies and checked the contents of our phones. If we don’t cooperate, we will be arrested immediately.  Even when searching and interrogating us, the armed police or the police still observed our expressions while searching and interrogating. If they think our expressions show nervousness or dissatisfaction, we will also be directly arrested.”

After arriving in the United States in the summer of 2022, Zhang got a U.S. phone and posted an article on Weibo criticizing the Chinese state from a new number. Chinese police showed up at her parents home at Xinjiang and threatened her parents, saying her mother would lose her teaching pension. “My parents are very upset at me for putting our family at risk, but I cannot be silent.” Zhang’s story is not an anomaly. Uighurs living in the US and Europe have told Deutsche Welle that Chinese authorities are going after family members still living in China to suppress activism by the Uighur community living abroad. And The Diplomat reports, “Mirroring the patterns of its repression at home, the CCP targets individual dissidents, their family members, and entire ethnic, religious, or social groups. Those at risk include former student activists from the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongolians, Falun Gong practitioners, human rights activists, journalists, former state employees, and others who criticize the regime.”

Progressives in the United States should remember always to align their voices with the oppressed people of China… not its oppressive leaders.

President Xi Jinping wants to be China’s leader for life, which could be a death knell for China’s ethnic minorities and civil rights activists. Professor Darren Byler of Simon Fraser University said, “Throughout Xi’s tenure China has expanded infrastructure and settlement of the Han majority group into the frontiers of the nation. These settlers were induced to move largely by for-profit corporations in search of natural resources, property and cheap workers. Ethnic minorities, particularly those who might be better understood as the peoples indigenous to China’s frontiers—such as Tibetans, Mongols, Uyghurs and Kazakhs have faced an onslaught of human rights violations as a result of this internal colonization. Despite living in constitutionally protected ‘Autonomous Regions’—something similar to the reservation system for Indigenous Americans—these peoples have seen their institutions—the schools, mosques, temples, banks, and courts—captured by the settler authorities. This means that today millions of ethnic minorities are going through a process of settler colonization that is unprecedented in Chinese history. This is particularly the case for the Uyghur people who have been subjected to mass internment, widespread family separation, forced labour, and residential schools.”

The Free Tibet Campaign once mobilized thousands of activists around the world. Today, little of traditional Tibet is left with China having annexed the territory in its homogenizing efforts. Professor Darren Byler of Simon Fraser University said, “There are many parallels between Tibetans and Uyghurs. Both are relatively large groups of 4.5 million and 11 million respectively. They speak their own languages as their native tongue, have their own faith practices, can often not pass as Han due to their racialized difference, and live in their own ancestral lands. These factors mean that it is difficult for these groups to be forcibly assimilated, and as a result both are viewed as threats to the sovereignty of the ethno-nationalist Chinese state.  To counteract this perceived threat, both are subjected to forced removal from their lands, residential school systems and police controls. The Uyghurs are perceived as an even greater threat due to a Chinese uptake of the U.S. led Global War on Terror. Since 9/11 Uyghurs have come to be viewed as Islamic radicals motivated by what Chinese state media refer to as an ‘ideology of hate.’ Normative Islamic practice such as mosque attendance or fasting during Ramadan is now perceived as a sign of terrorist tendencies. Islamophobia generated by the West has given the Chinese state and public a framework and justification to dehumanize an entire group of people. Tibetans on the other hand are often perceived as “backward” or “primitive” but less of a violent threat in need of mass incarceration.”

As Xi is set to secure his third term, the human rights community must continue to press him to respect the rights of all Chinese residents. The question of human rights in China has surprisingly become contentious among the American Left, with some fearing that to criticize the Chinese state is effectively to support American global hegemony.  Concerns about a new “cold war” between the United States and China have made the question feel yet more urgent.  However, progressives in the United States should remember always to align their voices with the oppressed people of China, like 25-year-old Zhang, not its oppressive leaders. We must show solidarity to people all over the world opposing state violence and always uplift the voices of people opposing oppressive and brutal regimes.

This article first appeared in the journal Common Dreams.

Between Islamophobia and homophobia: Life as an LGBTQ Uyghur in China

Illustration for SupChina by Alex Santafé

I had a friend who was a medical doctor. He was gay and he was Uyghur, like me. We knew he was HIV positive about a year ago, but he never took any antiviral drugs because he didn’t want his family to find out. Last month, very suddenly he got sick and died just like that — complications from AIDS. His family didn’t even know he was sick, so it was very sudden for them. It’s really sad. There are a lot of young boys, 17 or 18, on Blued. I don’t think any of them understand or know to use protection, and there are a lot of male prostitutes that don’t use protection either.

Erkin told me this story one day when I was living in Xinjiang. The prevalence of HIV among gay men in China was the main reason he wanted to talk to me. “Erkin” is a common male Uyghur name that means “Freedom,” and is a pseudonym. When we spoke, it was 2017 and I was living in Xinjiang. He had heard of me through mutual friends and contacted me on WeChat. He knew I was doing research with LGBTQ Uyghur populations, and he wanted me to know the story of his friend to make sure other people learned about HIV as a public health concern in China.

Erkin was concerned about the spread of HIV due to a culture of silence and ignorance. Experiences of shame around being gay means life and death for many HIV-positive LGBTQ people in China. For Han Chinese, the situation is bad; for Uyghurs, it can be even worse. LGBTQ Uyghurs face disproportionate discrimination due to their status as an ethnic minority battling both Islamophobia and internal group dynamics that vilify homosexuality.

Erkin and I walked around a busy bazaar in southern Ürümchi while we talked. For a time, we sat down at a kabob stand for some grilled lamb meat seasoned with cumin wrapped with naan. The kabob stand included a few tables under a tent; for us it was a tiny haven in the middle of a bustling market. Workers and customers were in close proximity. We had been speaking Uyghur, but at this point he apologized and explained that he would like to speak in English so that others would not be able to understand him. For Erkin, the Uyghur space of the market and kabob stand was not safe. He could only be open if he spoke a foreign language that nobody else there would understand.

Erkin carried himself with confidence and an aura of casualness. He seemed particularly aloof and monotone when relaying his queer life story — his coming out and his romantic history. He was humble and soft-spoken, unassuming and shy. He was mostly unsmiling and serious, but in a kind and gentle manner.

“When I was in high school, I came out to my best friend, who was a girl,” he told me. “She didn’t take it well. She cut off the friendship and we don’t talk anymore. After that I was really scared to come out to my friends, and I kept it a secret throughout college.”

He shrugged his shoulders with his hands in his pockets like it was no big deal that he had been rejected by his best friend and forced back into the closet. For him, such a reaction or attitude was normal and expected. Erkin, like many queer people, especially queer Uyghurs, carried a feeling of isolation when hiding his true sexual identity. While Erkin shared his pain with me, he expressed his desire for the world to know about the struggles of his people, those who were both gay and Uyghur.

After high school, Erkin left China, and it was while abroad that he first began to feel secure in his sexual identity.

“During college, I studied abroad in Europe,” he said. “While I was there, I had a boyfriend. His mom was a really conservative Christian who had a really hard time with her son coming out. But still, he really encouraged me to come out to my mom. He said to me, ‘Mothers always know their children. She probably already knows. You’ll feel so much better.’”

Leaving home, distancing oneself from family pressures, can have a huge influence in broadening one’s understanding of one’s own sexuality. LGBTQ Uyghurs who have been abroad or lived in eastern China have told me that it was after they left Xinjiang that they realized their true sexuality. Their stories emphasized the importance of leaving one’s hometown — allowing for new perspectives and freedom — as a key part of each person’s coming out.

“So, the next time I went home, I came out to [my mother],” Erkin said. “I explained that I wouldn’t be getting married. She cried, but other than that it wasn’t super dramatic. The next day it was as if nothing happened. I didn’t tell anyone else.”

His mother hid her emotions. She was not “dramatic” about it, in Erkin’s words. She did not show anger. She buried her emotions in secrecy instead, not telling anyone else in the family and pretending as though nothing had happened. A sense of privacy and distance between family members (called perdishep in Uyghur, from the root word for “curtain”) was an aspect of Uyghur culture that came up over and over again with Uyghurs, both gay and straight. The secrecy only encouraged Erkin’s masking and pushed him onto the periphery of society. He had to hide from the family that was trying to control him in order to withstand the pressures.

“My younger sister doesn’t know,” Erkin said. “I asked her about gay people to test the waters, and she said, ‘Yes, I have some classmates like that.’ But I could tell she was still closed-minded about it and not ready yet, but I will tell her someday. After I came out to my mother, I started coming out to my Uyghur friends and now a lot of them know.”

Erkin’s story is a story of the human desire to belong and to love. While he speaks to the pain of being queer, he expresses openness as well. He is confident he will come out to his younger sister eventually. Erkin also has a lot of pride and a lot of positive coming-out experiences, along with stories of loving and living.

Illustration for SupChina by Derek Zheng

If one lives in abundance and freedom, hiding may not be as necessary. Erkin had job security and a social network, so he could take the risk of coming out and losing family support. But when one lives in an environment of insecurity, as many Uyghurs do, then such secrets become important for survival.

As other researchers in minority LGBTQ communities have noted, being both a racial or ethnic minority and a sexual minority increases the risk of discrimination with the in-group and out-group, and even within the LGBTQ community itself. No one has done research with the LGBTQ Uyghur community specifically, so there is much we don’t know. But anecdotally, of the Uyghur people I talked to, all of them cited fear of losing their jobs and housing if they came out, not to mention complete lack of family support.

“I have a Han Chinese boyfriend now,” Erikin continued. “I’m not planning on getting a fake marriage with a woman ever, and not really planning on having kids or getting married to him either. I think as long as you’re happy, that’s all that matters. We have a really stable and respectful relationship; we don’t need to get married to prove that.”

Erkin displays a sense of security in his refusal to engage in a fake marriage. A 形婚 xínghūn, which literally means “marriage of appearance,” is a marriage between a gay man and a lesbian woman — a common practice among queers in China. Erkin does not want to live an inauthentic marriage life with a lesbian. In doing so, Erkin pushes back against a culture of shame, secrecy, and hiding, and displays confidence in his relationship, not needing approval from others.

Still, secrecy is a major theme in Erkin’s life. For anyone living in an anxious and insecure situation, secrecy can be a matter of life and death. For Erkin’s friend, secrecy was a death sentence from HIV/AIDS. For other LGBTQ Uyghurs, secrecy is the only way to find distance from suffocating control. They create distance with their family, which ultimately allows them to survive. For others, secrecy is the only way to maintain crucial family ties.

Queer Uyghurs are stuck between Islamophobia and homophobia. As Uyghurs, they experience racism from Han Chinese people and a Chinese government that classifies and targets them as threats strictly on their ethnicity. As queer people, they experience a heteronormative and patriarchal society that pressures them to get married and have children. Uyghur society enforces their oppression with strong gender norms and expectations as well as rejection of same-sex relationships.

In other words, queer Uyghurs themselves are caught between visibility and invisibility, censorship and self-censorship, being “out” and hiding in the closet. It is not safe for them to openly share their stories in Xinjiang. They are hiding with nowhere to go. They are victimized, objectified, erased, and silenced, and further visibility can lead to more violence.

Erikin walked me home at the end of our interview. He told me more of his feelings about how much Ürümchi has changed in the last few years — an explosion of new roads, buildings, migrants, and police officers.

“I used to miss Xinjiang, and when I came home, I would feel like I loved it here and this was my home,” he said. “Now, when I come home, not only because of the politics” — a word he used as an euphemism for the security crackdowns — “but also because I can’t talk about my boyfriend, it feels so strange to me. I don’t even like or want to come home now.”

This essay first appeared in the journal SupChina on June 8, 2022. It is republished here with permission.